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We address the efficiency of expenditure in education provision by comparing the 
output (PISA results) from the educational system of 25, mostly OECD, countries 
with resources employed (teachers per student, time spent at school). We estimate a 
semi-parametric model of the education production process using a two-stage 
procedure. By regressing data envelopment analysis output scores on non-
discretionary variables, both using Tobit and a single and double bootstrap procedure, 
we show that inefficiency is strongly related to GDP per head and adult educational 
attainment.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we systematically compare the output from the educational system of 25 
countries with resources employed (number of teachers per student, time spent at 
school). Using data envelopment analysis (DEA), we derive a theoretical production 
frontier for education. In the most favourable case, a country is operating on the 
frontier, and is considered as efficient. However, most countries are found to perform 
below the frontier and an estimate of the distance each country is from that border line 
is provided – the so-called efficiency score.  Moreover, estimating a semi-parametric 
model of the education production process using a two-stage approach, we show that 
inefficiency in the education sector is strongly related to two variables that are, at least 
in the short- to medium run, beyond the control of governments. These are the family 
economic background and the education of parents. 
 
In methodological terms, a two-stage approach has become increasingly popular when 
DEA is used to assess efficiency of decision-making units (DMUs). In some cases, 
this approach has been applied to the education sector
4, but rarely in an international 
framework with whole countries as units of observation. The most usual two-stage 
approach has been recently criticised in statistical terms.
5 The fact that DEA output 
scores are likely to be biased, and that the environmental variables are correlated to 
output and input variables, recommend the use of bootstrapping techniques, which are 
well suited for the type of modelling we apply here. Therefore, we employ both a 
more usual DEA/Tobit approach and single and double bootstrap procedures 
suggested by Simar and Wilson (2004). Our paper is one of the first application 
examples of this very recent technique. Our results following this technique are 
compared to the ones arising from the more traditional one. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section two we provide motivation and briefly 
review some of the literature and previous results on education provision efficiency. 
Section three outlines the methodological approach used in the paper and in section 
four we present and discuss the results of our efficiency analysis. Section five 
provides conclusions. 
                                                           
4 See Ruggiero (2004) for a survey. 
5 See Simar and Wilson (2000, 2004).   4
 
2. Motivation and literature on education efficiency 
 
Education is one of the most important services provided by governments in almost 
every country. According to OECD (2004a), OECD countries expended an average of 
6.2 percent of GDP in 2001 on education institutions, of which 4.8 percent of GDP 
were from public sources. In a general sense, education provision is efficient if its 
producers make the best possible use of available inputs, and the sole fact that 
educational inputs weight heavily on the public purse would call for a careful 
efficiency analysis.  An education system not being efficient would mean either that 
results (or “outputs”) could be increased without spending more, or else that expense 
could actually be reduced without affecting the outputs, provided that more efficiency 
is assured. Research results presented here indicate that there are cases where 
considerable improvements can be made in this respect. 
 
The fact of education spending being predominantly public is particularly true namely 
in OECD countries, and for all education levels. Table 1 summarises some relevant 
data for 30, mostly OECD, countries in 2001, concerning pre-primary, primary and 
secondary and tertiary education. For instance, and in what respects primary and 
secondary education provision, public expenditure as a share of total spending 
averaged 92.2%, ranging from 76.2% in Korea to more than 95% in several countries, 
namely Denmark, Finland, Italy, Portugal and Sweden. On the other hand, the average 
share of public spending in total spending for pre-primary and for tertiary levels was 
respectively 78.3% and 79.3%, the diversity among countries being now much higher. 
All in all, this implies that public resources accounted for some 88% of the total 
financing of education provision in the surveyed country sample. 
   5
Table 1 – Public expenditure on education, 2001 









All levels of 
education 
Australia 68.9  84.4  51.3  75.6 
Austria 79.3  96.3  94.6  94.4 
Belgium 96.6  95.0  84.1  93.0 
Czech Republic  91.8  92.1  85.3  90.6 
Denmark 81.7  98.0  97.8  96.1 
Finland 91.0  99.1  96.5  97.8 
France 95.9  93.0  85.6  92.0 
Germany 62.3  81.1  91.3  81.4 
Greece na  91.4  99.6  94.2 
Hungary 90.6  93.1  77.6  89.0 
Iceland na  95.3  95.0  91.7 
Indonesia 5.3  76.3  43.8  64.2 
Ireland 33.2  95.3  84.7  92.2 
Italy 97.0  98.0  77.8  90.7 
Japan 50.4  91.5  43.1  75.0 
Korea 48.7  76.2  15.9  57.1 
Mexico 86.7  87.2  70.4  84.6 
Netherlands 98.2  95.1  78.2  90.9 
Norway na  na  96.9  95.9 
Portugal na  99.9  92.3  98.5 
Slovak Republic  97.4  98.5  93.3  97.1 
Spain 83.4  93.3  75.5  87.8 
Sweden 100.0  99.9  87.7  96.8 
Switzerland na  84.8  na  na 
Thailand 97.8  na  82.5  95.6 
Tunisia na  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Turkey  na  na 95.8 na 
United Kingdom  95.7  87.2  71.0  84.7 
United States  68.1  93.0  34.0  69.2 
Uruguay 81.3  93.5  99.5  93.4 
Mean 78.3  92.2  79.3  88.2 
Median 86.7  93.3  85.3  91.9 
Minimum 5.3  76.2  15.9  57.1 
Maximum 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Standard deviation  24.3  6.8  21.8  10.8 
Observations 23  27  29  28 
 
Sources: Education at a Glance 2004, OECD – Tables B3.2a, B3.2b. 
Notes: Public expenditure on education includes public subsidies to households attributable for 
educational institutions and direct expenditure on educational institutions from international 
sources. Private expenditure on education is net of public subsidies attributable for educational 
institutions. na – not available. 
 
Concern with education also comes from the belief that this is an important source of 
human capital formation and therefore of economic growth, as suggested by economic 
theory.
6 However, empirical work on this relationship has not been conclusive, and 
                                                           
6 For recent literature surveys on the influence of human capital formation on growth, see Krueger and 
Lindahl (2001), Sianesi and Van Reenen (2003) and De la Fuente and Ciccone (2002).  
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the correlation between education and growth is not statistically significant in some 
published results.
7 Most empirical work on this field has progressed by means of 
cross-country regressions where human capital quantity measured as the average 
number of years of schooling is one of the independent variables deemed to explain 
growth. Some researchers have found that quality matters for growth. Namely, 
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Barro (2001) showed that education quality, as 
measured by international comparative tests of skills, has a strong relationship with 
economic growth.  
 
Moreover, the relevance of assessing the quality of public spending and redirecting it 
to more growth enhancing items is stressed in EC (2004) as being an important goal 
for governments to pursue. Additionally, there is also internationally a shift in the 
focus of the analysis from the amount of public resources used by a government, to 
the services delivered, and also to the outcomes achieved and their quality (see 
namely OECD (2003b)).  
 
In our research, we measure and compare education output across countries using 
precisely the abovementioned type of quality measures – we resort to the most recent 
cross-nationally comparable evidence on student performance, the 2003 results from 




Previous research on the international comparative performance of the public sector in 
general and of education systems in particular, including Afonso, Schuknecht and 
Tanzi (2003) for public expenditure in the OECD, St. Aubyn (2003) for education 
spending in the OECD and Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) for education and health in 
Africa, has already suggested that important inefficiencies are at work. All these 
studies use free disposable hull analysis (FDH) with inputs measured in monetary 
terms. Using both FDH and DEA analysis, Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005) studied 
efficiency in providing health and education in OECD countries using physically 
measured inputs and concluded that average input inefficiency varies between 0.859 
                                                           
7 See Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Pritchett (2001). 
8 OECD (2004b) presents the first results from PISA 2003. 
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and 0.886 – if all countries were efficient, input usage could be reduced by about 13 
percent without affecting output.  
 
In a related but separate research strand, some authors have studied the determinants 
of schooling quality across countries using cross-country regressions, by specifying 
and estimating linear models for the relationship between schooling quality and its 
determinants. The former is measured by cross-country comparative studies assessing 
learning achievement. The latter include resources allocated to education (e. g. 
teachers per pupil or expenditures per student) and other factors that may affect the 
educational output, such as parents’ income or instruction level. Barro and Lee (2001) 
find that student performance is positively correlated to the level of school resources, 
such as pupil-teacher ratios, and also to family background (income and education of 
parents). Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Hanushek and Luque (2003) find little or 
no evidence of a positive link from more resources allocated to the education system 
and test performance. However, they find that adult schooling levels have a positive 
and significant effect on student performance. 
 
In this paper, we put these two strands of the literature together by estimating a semi-
parametric model of the education production process using a two-stage approach. In 
a first stage, we determine the output efficiency score for each country, using the 
mathematical programming approach known as DEA, relating education inputs to 
outputs. In a second stage, these scores are explained using regression analysis. Here, 
we show that family background variables identified by previous authors are indeed 
highly correlated to inefficiency, i.e., they are significant “environmental variables”, 
using DEA jargon.
9 They are, however, of a fundamentally different nature from input 
variables, in so far as their values cannot be changed in a meaningful spell of time by 




                                                           
9 Throughout the paper we use interchangeably the terms “non-discretionary”, “exogenous” and 
“environmental” when qualifying variables or factors not initially considered in the DEA programme.   8
3. Analytical methodology 
 
3.1. DEA framework 
 
DEA, originating from Farrell (1957) seminal work and popularised by Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978), assumes the existence of a convex production frontier. 
This frontier in the DEA approach is constructed using linear programming methods, 
the term “envelopment” stemming from the fact that the production frontier envelops 
the set of observations.
10 
 
DEA allows the calculation of technical efficiency measures that can be either input 
or output oriented. The purpose of an output-oriented study is to evaluate by how 
much output quantities can be proportionally increased without changing the input 
quantities used. This is the perspective taken in this paper. Note, however, that one 
could also try to assess by how much input quantities can be reduced without varying 
the output. The two measures provide the same results under constant returns to scale 
but give different values under variable returns to scale. Nevertheless, both output and 
input-oriented models will identify the same set of efficient/inefficient producers or 
DMUs. 
 
The analytical description of the linear programming problem to be solved, output 
oriented and assuming variable returns to scale hypothesis, is sketched below. 
Suppose there are p inputs and q outputs for n DMUs. For the i-th DMU, yi is the 
column vector of the outputs and xi is the column vector of the inputs. We can also 
define X as the (p×n) input matrix and Y as the (q×n) output matrix. The DEA model 
is then specified with the following mathematical programming problem, for a given 
i-th DMU:  
 
                                                           
10 Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998) and Thanassoulis (2001) offer good introductions to the DEA 
methodology.   9
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In problem (1), δi is a scalar satisfying 1 ≥ i δ . It is the efficiency score that measures 
technical efficiency of the i-th unit as the distance to the efficiency frontier, the latter 
being defined as a linear combination of best practice observations. With 1 > i δ , the 
decision unit is inside the frontier (i.e. it is inefficient), while  1 = i δ  implies that the 
decision unit is on the frontier (i.e. it is efficient). 
 
The vector λ is a (n×1) vector of constants, which measures the weights used to 
compute the location of an inefficient DMU if it were to become efficient. The 
inefficient DMU would be projected on the production frontier as a linear 
combination of its peers using those weights. The peers are other DMUs that are more 
efficient and therefore used as references. 
 
1 n  is a n-dimensional vector of ones. The restriction  1 ' 1 = λ n  imposes convexity of 
the frontier, accounting for variable returns to scale. Dropping this restriction would 
amount to admit that returns to scale were constant. 
 
Notice that problem (1) has to be solved for each of the n DMUs in order to obtain n 
efficiency scores. 
 
3.2. Non-discretionary inputs and the DEA/Tobit two-steps procedure 
 
The standard DEA models as the one described in (1) incorporate only discretionary 
inputs, those whose quantities can be changed at the DMU will, and do not take into 
account the presence of environmental variables or factors, also known as non-
discretionary inputs. However, socio-economic differences may play a relevant role in 
determining heterogeneity across DMUs – either secondary schools, universities or 
countries’ achievements in an international comparison – and influence educational   10
outcomes. These exogenous socio-economic factors can include, for instance, 
household wealth and parental education.  
 
As non-discretionary and discretionary inputs jointly contribute to each DMU outputs, 
there are in the literature several proposals on how to deal with this issue, implying 
usually the use of two-stage and even three-stage models.
11  
 
Let zi be a (1×r) vector of non-discretionary outputs. In a typical two-stage approach, 
the following regression is estimated:  
 
  i i i z ε β δ + = ˆ ,   (2) 
 
where  i δˆ  is the efficiency score that resulted from stage one, i.e. from solving (1). β is 
a (r×1) vector of parameters to be estimated in step two associated with each 
considered non-discretionary input. The fact that  1 ˆ ≥ i δ  has led many researchers to 




Figure 1 illustrates the basic idea behind a two-stage approach. In a simplified one 
output and one input DEA problem, A, B and C are found to be efficient, while D is 
an inefficient DMU. The output score for unit D equals (d1+d2)/d1, and is higher than 
one. However, unit D inefficiency may be partly ascribed to a “harsh environment” – 
a number of perturbing environmental factors may imply that unit D produces less 
than the theoretical maximum, even if discretionary inputs are efficiently used. In our 
example, and if the environment for unit D was more favourable (e. g. similar to the 
sample average), then we would have observed Dc. In other words, unit D would have 
produced more and would be nearer the production possibility.  The environment 
corrected output score would be (d1c+d2c)/d1c, lower than (d1+d2)/d1, and closer to 
unity.  
                                                           
11 See Ruggiero (2004) and Simar and Wilson (2004) for an overview. 
12 See Simar and Wilson (2004) for an extensive list of published examples of the two step approach. In 
what concerns education, Kirjavainen and Loikkanen (1998) is a good example of the DEA/Tobit 
approach.   11
 






3.3. Non-discretionary inputs and bootstrap 
 
The two-stage method has been criticised in so far as results are likely to be biased in 
small samples
13. Note that a perturbation to an observation located on the DEA 
estimated frontier will shift that very same frontier.  As a result, some DMUs will find 
themselves closer or further to the frontier, and their scores will change accordingly. 
In terms of equation (2), this means that the error term εi is serially correlated in a 
complicated and unknown way. As the sample increases, this correlation disappears 
slowly in the DEA context.  An additional source of bias comes from the fact that that 
non-discretionary variables zi in equation (2), are correlated to the error term εi. This 
correlation derives from the correlation between non-discretionary inputs and the 
outputs (and most probably the other inputs), which were the ingredients to estimate 
the scores. Again, this last correlation also disappears asymptotically, but at a slow 
rate.  
 
                                                           
13 This is recognised by Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998), p. 171. We follow Simar and Wilson (2004), 
who take this point very seriously.   12
Thus, standard approaches to inference are usually not valid in small samples. To 
overcome this, Simar and Wilson (2004) propose an alternative estimation and 
inference procedures based on bootstrap methods.  
 
Assume that the true efficiency score depends on the environmental variables, so that 
 
 , 1 ) , ( ≥ + = i i i z ε β ψ δ    (3) 
 
where  ψ  is a smooth, continuous function and β  a vector of parameters. εi is a 
truncated normal random variable, distributed  ) , 0 (
2
ε σ N  with left-truncation at 
) , ( 1 β ψ i z − .  
 
The efficiency score that solves problem (1),  i δˆ , is then considered as an estimate for 
i δ , and this is the first stage in the procedure. The second stage is designed to assess 
the influence of non-discretionary inputs on efficiency. Simar and Wilson (2004) 
propose two algorithms to achieve these two stages, which are presented below
14. 
 
The first algorithm involves the following steps: 
 
[1] The computation of  i δˆ  for all n decision units by solving problem (1); 
[2] The estimation of equation (2) by maximum likelihood, considering it is a 
truncated regression (and not a censored or Tobit regression).
15 Denote by β ˆ  and  ε σ ˆ  
the maximum likelihood estimates of β  and σε. 
[3] The computation of L bootstrap estimates for β  and σε, in the following way: 
 
For i = 1, ...., n draw εi
  from a normal distribution with variance 
2 ˆε σ  and left 
truncation at  β ˆ 1 i z −  and compute  i i i z ε β δ + = ˆ * . 
                                                           
14 We implemented these algorithms in Matlab. Programmes and functions are available on request. 
15 In a censored regression, it is assumed that independent variables are always observed, even if there 
is some information loss concerning the dependent variable. In a truncated regression, neither 
independent nor dependent variables are observed in some cases. See Simar and Wilson (2004) for 
details. 
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Estimate the truncated regression of 
*
i δ  on zi by maximum likelihood, yielding 
a bootstrap estimate (
* * ˆ , ˆ
ε σ β ). 
 
With a large number of bootstrap estimates (e.g. L=2000), it becomes possible to test 
hypotheses and to construct confidence intervals for β  and σε. For example, suppose 
that we want to determine the p-value for a given estimate 0 ˆ
1 < β .  This will be given 
by the relative frequency of nonnegative
*
1 ˆ β  bootstrap estimates. 
 
It can be shown that the estimate  i δˆ  is biased towards 1 in small samples. Simar and 
Wilson (2004) second bootstrap procedure, “algorithm 2”, includes a parametric 
bootstrap in the first stage problem, so that bias-corrected estimates for the efficiency 
scores are produced. The production of these bias-corrected scores is done as follows: 
 
[1] Compute  i δˆ  for all n decision units by solving problem (1); 
[2] Estimate equation (2) by maximum likelihood, considering it is a truncated 
regression. Let β ˆ  and  ε σ ˆ  be the maximum likelihood estimates of β  and σε. 
[3] Obtain L1 bootstrap estimates for each δi, the following way: 
 
For i = 1, ...., n draw εi
  from a normal distribution with variance 
2 ˆε σ  and left 









= , be a modified output measure. 
Compute 
* ˆ




* ... n y y Y = . (But note that yi is not replaced by
*
i y  in the left-hand side 
of the first restriction of the problem.) 
[4] Compute the bias-corrected output inefficiency estimator as
* ˆ ˆ . 2 ˆ ˆ
i i i δ δ δ − = , where 
* ˆ
i δ  is the bootstrap average of
* ˆ
i δ . 
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Once these first stage bias-corrected measures are produced, algorithm 2 continues by 
replacing  i δˆ  with  i δˆ ˆ  in algorithm 1, from step 2 onwards. Following Simar and 
Wilson (2004), we set L1=100.  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1. Data and indicators
16 
 
Education achievement, the output, is measured by the performance of 15-year-olds 
on the PISA reading, mathematics, problem solving, and science literacy scales in 
2003. Note that the PISA programme was specially conceived to “monitor the 
outcomes of education systems in terms of student achievement on a regular basis and 
within an internationally accepted common framework”.
17 Students from 40 countries 
were therefore evaluated with the same set of questions to be solved, in what 
constitutes the more recent exercise of this kind. In a parsimonious formulation, we 
use the four scores country average.
18  
 
As performance of 15-year olds is likely to depend on resources employed not only in 
one year, but also in previous years, we have taken time average values. We use two 
input measures:  
- the total intended instruction time in public institutions in hours per year for the 12 
to 14-year-olds, average for 2000-2002;  
- the number of teachers per student in public and private institutions for secondary 
education, calculations based on full-time equivalents, average for 2000-2002.
19 Table 
2 summarises the key statistics for our selected data sample. 
 
                                                           
16 The data and the sources used in this paper are presented in the Annex.  
17 See OECD (2004b, pp. 3).  
18 The four results in the PISA report are highly correlated, with correlation coeficients ranging from 
0.94 and 0.99. 
19 Since with a non-parametric approach, higher performance is directly linked with higher input levels, 
we constructed the variable “Teachers Per Student,” TPS, where  ( ) 100 /
1× =
− Teachers Students TPS , 
using the original information for the students-to-teachers ratio (see Annex). Naturally, one would 
expect education performance to increase with the number of teachers per student.    15
Note that the number of observations used in the empirical analysis is lower than the 
number of countries that participated in the PISA, because some input variables are 
not available for some units in the sample. 
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Note: FI – Finland; IND – Indonesia; JP – Japan; KOR – Korea; NO – Norway; PT – 
Portugal; THA – Thailand. 
 
Input measures such as the ones we are considering here, have been used by several 
other authors studying the relationship between educational inputs and outputs. 
Examples are Barro (2001), Hanushek and Kimko (2000), Hanushek and Luque 
(2003) and Kirjavainen and Loikkanen (1998). 
 
We have considered the option of using education spending per student as an input. 
However, results would be hardly interpretable, as they would reflect both 
inefficiency and cost provision differences. For example, countries where teachers are 
better paid would tend to show up as inefficient, irrespective of the intrinsic 
performance of the education system. Moreover, results would also depend on the 
exchange rate used to convert expenses to the same units. Physical inputs and outputs 
have the important advantage of being comparable across countries without the need 
of any questionable transformation. 
 
4.2. DEA efficiency results 
 
In Table 3 we report results for the standard DEA variable-returns-to-scale technical 
efficiency scores and peers of each of the 25 considered countries.    16
 
Table 3 – Results for education efficiency (n=25) 
2 inputs (teachers-students ratio, hours in school) and 1 output (PISA 2003 indicator) 
 
DEA Output oriented 
Country  VRS TE  Rank 
Peers 
 
Australia 1.038  7  Finland 
Austria 1.095  14  Finland 
Belgium 1.055  8  Finland 
Czech Republic  1.068  9  Finland 
Denmark 1.093  13  Finland 
Finland 1.000  1  Finland 
France 1.072  10  Finland 
Germany 1.083  12  Finland,  Korea 
Greece 1.182  21  Finland 
Hungary 1.105  15  Finland 
Indonesia 1.447  25  Finland,  Korea 
Ireland 1.079  11  Finland,  Korea 
Italy 1.151  19  Finland 
Japan 1.024  4  Finland,  Korea 
Korea 1.000  1  Korea 
Netherlands 1.037  6  Finland,  Korea 
New Zealand  1.036  5  Finland, Korea 
Norway 1.109  16  Finland 
Portugal 1.161  20  Finland 
Slovak Republic  1.118  17  Finland 
Spain 1.129  18  Finland 
Sweden 1.000  1  Sweden 
Thailand 1.283  24  Finland,  Korea 
Turkey  1.260  22  Finland, Korea, Sweden 
Uruguay 1.278  23  Finland,  Korea 
Average 1.116   
 
  Note: VRS TE – variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 
 
It is possible to observe from Table 3 that three countries would be labelled as the 
most efficient ones with the standard DEA approach: Finland, Korea, and Sweden. 
Finland and Korea are located in the efficient frontier because they perform quite well 
in the PISA survey, getting respectively the first and the second position in the overall 
education performance index ranking. Sweden is also an above average performer 
concerning the output measure, using below average inputs. Another set of three 
countries is located on the opposite end – Thailand, Turkey and Uruguay. DEA 
analysis indicates that their output could be increased by more than 25 percent if they 
were to become efficient.
20 On average and as a conservative estimate, countries 
could have increased their results by 11.6 percent using the same resources. 
                                                           
20 We also used an extended country sample including Brazil and Mexico. However, these two 
countries are efficient by default, not showing up as peers to other DMUs, and are quite below average   17
 
One can briefly compare this set of results with the ones reported by Afonso and St. 
Aubyn (2005) that addressed education efficiency using the PISA 2000 performance 
indicator and a similar set of inputs, even if, as mentioned by OECD (2004b), the 
PISA 2000 and the PISA 2003 are not fully comparable (the latter included an extra 
item). Interestingly, the countries located in the efficient frontier were Finland, Korea, 
Japan, and Sweden, essentially the same results as the ones we report.  
 
 
4.3. Explaining inefficiency – the role of non-discretionary inputs 
 
Using the DEA efficiency scores computed in the previous subsection, we now 
evaluate the importance of non-discretionary inputs. We present results both from 
Tobit regressions and bootstrap algorithms. Even if Tobit results are possibly biased, 
it is not clear that bootstrap estimates are necessarily more reliable. In fact, the latter 
are based on a set of assumptions that may be disputed. Equation (3) summarises 
some of these important assumptions concerning the data generation process and the 
perturbation term distribution. Taking the pros and cons of both methods into account, 
it seems sensible to apply both of them. If outcomes are comparable, this adds 
robustness and confidence to the results we are interested in.  
 
In order to explain the efficiency scores, we regress them on GDP per capita, Y, and 
parents’ educational attainment, E, as follows
21 
 
  i i i i E Y ε β β β δ + + + = 2 1 0 ˆ .   (4) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
in one of the inputs (Mexico has the lowest teachers per students ratio) or both of them (Brazil). Given 
the inputs allocated to education provision by these countries, their performance in the PISA index is 
not comparable to any other country with similar or inferior outcome and with lower inputs. Moreover, 
one has to note that Brazil and Mexico are among lowest PISA survey performers. Therefore, we do 
not consider these efficient by default DMUs in the main text. Their inclusion would not affect further 
results in any meaninful way. The interested reader may refer to the Appendix, where we present main 
results for the extended sample.  
21 Parents’ educational attainment is given by the percentage of population aged 35–44 that has attained 
at least upper secondary education in 2001–2002, and GDP per capita refers to 2003 (see the Annex). 
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We first report in Table 4 results from the censored normal Tobit regressions for 
several alternative specifications of equation (4), namely including only one of the 
explanatory variables or taking logs of GDP per head. 
 
Table 4 – Censored normal Tobit results  
(25 countries) 
 Model  1 
 





































Notes: Y – GDP per capita; E – Parental educational attainment.  ε σ ˆ  – Estimated standard deviation of 
ε. P- values in brackets. 
 
Inefficiency in the education sector is strongly related to two variables that are, at 
least in the short to medium run, beyond the control of governments: the family 
economic background, proxied here by the country GDP per capita, and the education 
of parents. The estimated coefficients of both non-discretionary inputs are statistically 
significant and negatively related to the efficiency measure. For instance, an increase 
in parental education achievement reduces the efficiency score, implying that the 
relevant DMU moves closer to the theoretical production possibility frontier. 
Therefore, the better the level of parental education attainment, the higher the 
efficiency of secondary education provision in a given country. The same reasoning 
applies to the second non-discretionary input, with higher GDP per capita resulting in 
more efficiency.  
 
Adults’ educational attainment tends to be higher in richer countries, the correlation 
coefficient between E and Y being equal to 0.59. Even so, adding educational 
attainment to the right hand side of a regression where income is already there results 
in a clearly better fit. The estimated standard deviation of ε is substantially smaller for 
model 3a (where both education and income are present) than for models 1a or 2 
(where income or education are not included, respectively). Moreover, this error term 
variance reduction goes in pair with coefficients for both explanatory variables that   19
are highly significant in statistical terms, with p-values equal or smaller than 0.001. 
That both factors may act in a separate way is suggested by identifying a group of 
countries in the sample that display high values for educational attainment in spite of 
being poorer than average (the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Korea) 
contrasting to richer countries with lower levels of adult education (Italy, Spain, 
Portugal). 
 
Additionally, we also considered the ratio of public-to-total expenditure in secondary 
education as a non-discretionary input. However, this variable did not prove to be 
statistically significant, probably because most spending in this level of education is 
essentially public and high for most countries. We report those results in the 
Appendix, for a more reduced country sample due to data availability. 
 
Table 5 reports the estimation results from the bootstrap procedures employing 
algorithms 1 and 2, as described in sub-section 3.3. Estimated coefficients are very 
similar irrespective of the algorithm used to estimate them. Moreover, they are close 
to the estimates derived from the more usual Tobit procedure, and, very importantly, 
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Table 5 – Bootstrap results  
(25 countries) 
Algorithm 1 
 Model  1 
 





































 Model  1 
 





































Notes: Y – GDP per capita; E – Parental educational attainment.  ε σ ˆ  – Estimated standard deviation of 
ε; P- values in brackets. 
 
In all three methods, it is apparent that Model 3a provides the best fit (as can be seen 
by the lower estimated standard deviation of ε).  This is important and robust 
empirical evidence that efficiency in education depends both on a country’s wealth 
and on parents’ education levels.  In a nutshell, students coming from poorer countries 
where adults’ education levels are low tend to under perform, so that results are 
further away from the efficiency frontier.  
 
Equation (4) can be regarded as a decomposition of the output efficiency score into 
two distinct parts: 
  – the one that is the result of a country’s environment, and given by 
i i E Y 2 1 0 β β β + + ;   21
  –  the one that includes all other factors that have an influence on efficiency, 
including therefore inefficiencies associated with the education system itself, and 
given by εt. 
 
The first column in Table 6 includes the bias corrected scores for Model 3a, the one 
with the best fit.
22 Recall that algorithm 2 implies a bias correction after estimating 
output efficiency scores by solving program (1) and taking into account the 
correlation between these scores and the environmental variables. We also present 
score corrections for the two environmental variables. GDP and education attainment 
corrections were computed as the changes in scores by artificially considering that Y 
and  E varied to the sample average in each country. Fully corrected scores are 
estimates of output scores purged from environmental effects and result from the 
summation of the previous three columns. 
 
Comparing the ranks in the last column of Table 6, resulting from corrections for both 
bias and environmental variables, with the previously presented ranking from the 
standard DEA analysis (see Table 3 above), it is apparent that significant changes 
occurred. For instance, countries previously poorly ranked are now less far away from 
the production possibility frontier – this is the case of Portugal, Uruguay, Hungary, 
Turkey and Spain. On the other hand, some countries see a worsening in their relative 
position after taking into account environmental variables, namely Sweden, Japan, 










                                                           
22 Estimated bias corrected scores were very similar across models. A full set of results is available 
upon request. 
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Australia 1.047  0.037  -0.007  1.077  3 
Austria 1.104  0.040  0.030  1.174  22 
Belgium 1.063  0.033  -0.001  1.095  7 
Czech Republic  1.083  -0.041  0.046  1.087  6 
Denmark 1.108  0.048  0.028  1.184  23 
Finland 1.037  0.027  0.035  1.100  8 
France 1.082  0.028  0.005  1.115  14 
Germany 1.104  0.029  0.037  1.170  21 
Greece 1.191  -0.015  -0.010  1.167  20 
Hungary 1.115  -0.058  0.024  1.082  4 
Indonesia 1.528  -0.257  -0.075  1.196  24 
Ireland 1.094  0.068  -0.002  1.159  19 
Italy 1.160  0.026  -0.028  1.159  18 
Japan 1.044  0.032  0.052  1.127  17 
Korea 1.075  -0.030  0.023  1.068  2 
Netherlands 1.066 0.038 0.009 1.112  13 
New Zealand  1.068  -0.007  0.026  1.087  5 
Norway 1.131  0.069  0.046  1.246  25 
Portugal 1.172  -0.026  -0.080  1.067  1 
Slovak Republic  1.131  -0.068  0.045  1.108  10 
Spain 1.140  0.000  -0.035  1.105  9 
Sweden 1.052  0.024  0.039  1.116  15 
Thailand 1.348  -0.146  -0.082  1.120  16 
Turkey 1.343  -0.162  -0.072  1.109  12 
Uruguay 1.296  -0.134  -0.053  1.109  11 
Average 1.143  -0.018  0.000  1.126   
 
Additionally, by looking at GDP and education attainment corrections in Table 6, it is 
apparent that in some countries, environmental “harshness” essentially results from 
poor adult education, and less from low GDP per head, as in Spain and Portugal. In 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Korea, on the other hand, lower than average GDP 
is offset by higher educational attainment. Finally, note that Indonesia, Thailand, 
Turkey and Uruguay are countries where both environmental variables strongly push 
down performance, as opposed to the Scandinavian countries or Japan. 
 
Figure 2 further illustrates the ranking changes. Countries below and to the right of 
the diagonal improve their relative position after non-discretionary inputs information 
have been accounted for. On the other hand, countries above and to the left of the 
diagonal face a worsening of their relative positions once the efficiency scores have 
been corrected. 
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Note: AUS – Australia; AU – Austria; BE – Belgium; CZ - Czech Republic; DK – 
Denmark; FI – Finland; FR – France; DE – Germany; EL – Greece; HU – Hungary; 
IND – Indonesia; IR – Ireland; IT – Italy; JP – Japan; KOR – Korea; NL – 
Netherlands; NZ - New Zealand; NO – Norway; PT – Portugal; SK - Slovak Republic; 
ES – Spain; SW – Sweden; THA – Thailand; TUR – Turkey; URU - Uruguay. 
 
By comparing efficiency scores changes following the bias correction and information 
about exogenous factors, we can also check which countries actually approached the 
production possibility frontier, and by how much. These changes are depicted in 
Figure 3 – negative (positive) changes correspond to countries that move closer 
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Figure 3 – Change in efficiency scores after correction 

































































































Note: see note to Figure 2 for country abbreviations. 
 
Figure 3 essentially derives from the environmental harshness in each considered 
country. Indonesia, for example, being the poorest country in the sample and the 
second worst in terms of parents` educational attainment, is the place where 
environment is less favourable to student achievement. This implies that a bias 
corrected output score of 1.528 is reduced to 1.196, meaning that about 62.9 percent 
of measured inefficiency may be ascribed to exogenous factors. Norway is one 
opposite case – this is the richest country in the sample, and one where adults are 
more instructed. Taking this into account, leads to the highest fully corrected output 
score, 1.246. Note that Norwegian PISA average performance (492.23) was below 




In this paper, we have evaluated efficiency in providing secondary education across 
countries by assessing outputs (student performance) against inputs directly used in 
the education system (teachers, student time) and environment variables (wealth and 
parents’ education). In methodological terms, we have employed a two-stage semi-
parametric procedure. Firstly, output efficiency scores were estimated by solving a   25
standard DEA problem with countries as DMUs. Secondly, these scores were 
explained in a regression with the environmental variables as independent variables. 
 
Results from the first-stage imply that inefficiencies may be quite high. On average 
and as a conservative estimate, countries could have increased their results by 11.6 
percent using the same resources
23, with a country like Indonesia displaying a waste 
of 44.7 percent.  
 
The fact that a country is seen as far away from the efficiency frontier is not 
necessarily a result of inefficiencies engendered within the education system. Our 
second stage procedures show that GDP per head and parents’ educational attainment 
are highly and significantly correlated to output scores – a wealthier and more 
cultivated environment are important conditions for a better student performance. 
Moreover, it becomes possible to correct output scores by considering the harshness 
of the environment where the education system operates. Country rankings and output 
scores derived from this correction are substantially different from standard DEA 
results.  
 
Non-discretionary outputs considered here cannot be changed in the short run. For 
example, parental educational attainment is essentially given when considering 
students performance in the coming year. However, contemporaneous educational and 
social policy will have an impact on future parents’ educational attainment. As the 
children of today are the parents of tomorrow, and considering that parental 
educational attainment is an important determinant of students’ outcomes, it results 
that policies oriented towards reducing present school dropout rates or increasing 
youth education length will positively affect the future efficiency of the educational 
system of given country. 
 
Finally, note that we have applied both the usual DEA/Tobit procedure and two very 
recently proposed bootstrap algorithms. Results were strikingly similar with these 
three different estimation processes, which bring increased confidence to obtained 
conclusions.   
                                                           
23 This results from the average output score from Table 3. Any bias correction necessarily implies 
higher average scores, as in Table 6.   26
Appendix – Additional Tobit and bootstrap results 
 
Table A1 – Censored normal Tobit results 
(27 countries, includes Brazil and Mexico) 
 
 Model  1 
 





































Notes: Y – GDP per capita; E – Parental educational attainment.  ε σ ˆ  – Estimated standard deviation of 
ε; P- values in brackets. 
 
Table A2 – Censored normal Tobit results 
(21 countries) 
 





















































Notes: Pub – public-to-total expenditure in education ratio. Y – GDP per capita; E – Parental 
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Table A3 – Bootstrap results 




 Model  1 
 
Model 2  Model 3  Model 1a  Model 3a 










Y  -0.22800e-4 
(0.000) 
  -0.14238e-4 
(0.001) 
  








  -0.00336 
(0.048) 












 Model  1 
 
Model 2  Model 3  Model 1a  Model 3a 










Y  -0.12303e-4 
(0.000) 
  -0.060890e-4 
(0.002) 
  








  -0.0018025 
(0.0025) 











Notes: Y – GDP per capita; E – Parental educational attainment.  ε σ ˆ  – Estimated standard deviation of 
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Australia 526.15  1023.7  8.0  29143.  4  61.1  84.6 
Austria 498.35  1072.5  10.0  29972.  5  81.9  96.0 
Belgium 517.59  1005.0  10.5  28396.  1  64.6  94.4 
Brazil 379.84  800.0  5.5  7767.  2  57.3     
Czech Republic  511.16  867.0  7.5 16448.  2 90.5  91.9 
Denmark 499.65  860.0  7.8  31630.  2  80.5  97.9 
Finland 545.90  807.0  7.3  27252.  2  84.7  99.3 
France 509.34  1037.0  8.1  27327.  2  67.9  93.0 
Germany 502.53  886.0  6.6  27608.  8  85.6  80.8 
Greece 461.67  1064.0  10.1 19973.  2  59.4  91.6 
Hungary 494.06  925.0  8.7  14572.  3  78.6  92.9 
Iceland 501.57  821.9  na  30657.  3  61.0  95.2 
Indonesia 374.55  1274.0  5.5  3364.  5  22.7  76.4 
Ireland 505.54  896.3  7.0  36774.  8  63.7  95.7 
Italy 474.31  1020.0  9.8  27049.  9  49.4  97.9 
Japan 531.79  875.0  6.7  28162.  2  94.0  91.6 
Korea 541.29  867.0  5.1  17908.  4  77.8  78.5 
Mexico 393.56  1166.9  3.3  9136.  2  15.6  86.7 
Netherlands 523.87  1066.9  6.1  29411.  8  69.9  94.8 
New Zealand  524.68  952.6  6.1  21176. 9  79.6  na 
Norway 492.23  826.8  9.6  37063.  4  90.8  99.2 
Poland 492.81  na  6.8  11622.  9  47.9  na 
Portugal 470.29  881.7  11.5  18443.  5  20.0  99.9 
Russian Federation  469.61  989.0  8.9  9195. 2  na  na 
Slovak Republic  488.49  886.3  7.4  13468. 7  90.3  98.1 
Spain 483.75  907.2  8.6  22264.  45.3  93.1 
Sweden 509.50  740.9  7.3  26655.  5  86.8  99.9 
Switzerland 514.99  887.0 na  30186.  1  87.3 86.9 
Thailand 422.73  1167.0  5.6  7580.  3  19.0  97.8 
Tunisia 365.70  890.0  4.6  7082.  9  na  100.0 
Turkey 426.54  841.3  5.7  6749.  3  24.7  na 
United States  486.67  na  6.5  37352. 1  88.5  91.5 
Uruguay 426.35  913.0  6.9  8279.  9  35.1  93.5 
Mean 480.82  942.5  7.4  21202.3  63.9  92.8 
Minimum 365.70  740.9  3.3  3364.5  15.6  76.4 
Maximum 545.90  1274.0  11.5  37352.1  94.0  100.0 
Standard deviation  48.87  122.0  1.9  10168.7  24.6  6.5 
Observations 33 31 31  33 31  28 
na – not available. 
1/ Average of performance of 15-years-old on the PISA reading, mathematics, problem solving and science 
literacy scales, 2003. Source: OECD (2004b). 
2/ Total intended instruction time in public institutions in hours per year for 12 to 14-years-old, average for 
2000-2002. Source: OECD (2002, 2003a, 2004a, Table D1.1). 
3/ Students per teaching staff in public and private institutions, secondary education, calculations based on 
full-time equivalents, average for 2000-2002. Source: OECD (2002, 2003a, 2004a, Table D2.2). 
4/ PPP GDP and population in 2003. Source: World Development Indicators Database, September 2003. 
5/ Population that has attained at least upper secondary education, aged 35-44, average for 2001-2002. 
OECD(2003a, Table A1.2, 2004a, Table A2.2). 
6/ Public-to-total expenditure in upper secondary education ratio, average for 2000-2001. Source: OECD 
(2003a, 2004a, Table B3.2a). 